In many cases the optimal open-loop policy to influence agents who solve dynamic problems is time inconsistent. We show how to construct a time-consistent open-loop policy rule. We also consider an additional restriction under which the time-consistent open-loop policy is stationary. We use examples to illustrate the properties of these tax rules. r
Introduction
When non-strategic agents with rational expectations solve dynamic optimization problems, and a government (or some other ''leader'') attempts to influence the agents' decisions, the government's optimal program is often time inconsistent. However, the possibility that the optimal program is time consistent is more general than is widely believed. We extend results in [6] by developing a simple means of testing whether a given open-loop policy rule, such as a linear income tax, is time consistent. This approach also identifies the (possibly non-linear) form of the policy that ensures time consistency, for a wide class of utility and production functions.
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Alternatively, given a particular functional form for the government's policy rule, we can select utility and production functions for which that policy rule is time consistent. The condition for consistency of the tax policies is intuitive: the effect of the tax on the agent's present discounted value of future utility must be independent of the level of capital (wealth). We then identify a stationary time-consistent policy rule that is subgame perfect.
The model
Our model is standard in the literature on optimal taxation in continuous time (see [1, 6] ). A representative agent chooses a consumption trajectory cðtÞ in order to maximize the present discounted value of utility. The agent's wealth (capital stock) is kðtÞ which yields the instantaneous output f ðkðtÞÞ: The tax rule is gðk; tÞ; so after-tax income is f ðkðtÞÞ À gðk; tÞ and investment is dk dt ¼ f ðkðtÞÞ À gðk; tÞ À cðtÞ: The government pays for the flow of a public good, GðtÞ; using taxes, without borrowing, so GðtÞ ¼ gðk; tÞ: The utility of consumption is UðcÞ and the utility derived from the public good is V ðGÞ; both functions are concave. The agent's optimization problem is 
The agent behaves as if aggregate tax collection, and thus the provision of the public good, is given. In view of the (assumed) separability of the instantaneous payoff, we can ignore the term V ðGðtÞÞ in studying the agent's control problem. We adopt the following assumptions. Assumption 2. The feasible set of open-loop policy rules does not enable the government to achieve the first best outcome.
Assumption 3. The government's tax policy is multiplicatively separable: gðk; tÞ ¼ bðkÞtðtÞ for some functions bðkÞ and tðtÞ:
Assumption 1 rules out uninteresting complications caused by corner solutions. Assumption 2 states that the tax rule does not give the government enough leverage to achieve the first best outcome, and thus eliminates a trivial reason for time consistency. This assumption rules out a poll tax. Assumption 3 allows us to concentrate on interesting special cases: a linear income tax ðbðkÞ ¼ f ðkÞÞ; a linear capital tax ðbðkÞ ¼ kÞ; and a non-linear income or capital tax ðbðkÞak; bðkÞaf ðkÞÞ: (A subsequent footnote explains how our major result changes when we drop Assumption 3.) Fixing the function bðkÞ does not restrict the government's ability to raise tax revenue for a given level of k; because the government is able to choose tðtÞ:
We use the following: Definition 1. Conditional on fixed bðkÞ; a tax policy bðkÞtðtÞ is time consistent if and only if the trajectory tðtÞ that is optimal at time t ¼ 0 remains optimal at every tX0 along the equilibrium trajectory.
If the agent believes that the government will adhere to the announced policy bðkÞtðtÞ and behaves optimally given this belief, then the government has no incentive to deviate from the time-dependent part of the policy, tðtÞ:
The qualifier ''conditional on fixed bðkÞ'' in Definition 1 means that the policy is ''conditionally time consistent''. Most discussions of time consistency implicitly contain this kind of conditionality. For example, Xie finds the time-consistent policy conditional on the use of a linear income tax ðbðkÞ ¼ f ðkÞÞ: Since a major point of our paper is to show that we can always find a time-consistent policy by the appropriate choice of bðkÞ; it is important that we make this conditionality explicit. Hereafter we use the terms ''time consistent'' and ''conditionally time consistent'' interchangeably. A time-consistent policy is not necessarily subgame perfect.
The time-consistent tax policy
We assume that the necessary conditions to the agent's control problem provide a solution to that problem. Given the concavity of UðcÞ; the necessary conditions are sufficient if f ðkÞ À tðtÞbðkÞ is concave. The function tðtÞbðkÞ is endogenous; we can check concavity after finding a candidate solution.
Ignoring [5] were among the first to use this method of solving Stackelberg differential games. In addition to the examples cited in [6] , applications include [2] [3] [4] . 
Proof. From Proposition 1, the optimal consumption rule is a function only of k: Substituting this optimal rule, c ¼ c Ã ðkÞ; into Eq. (2) and using Jðk; tÞ ¼ W ðkÞ þ ZðtÞ from Proposition 1, we write the agent's maximized Bellman equation as
The additive separability of Jðk; tÞ requires that the right side of Eq. (4) must also be additively separable for any admissible tðtÞ: This requirement implies Eq. (3) with a equal to a constant. &
The left side of Eq. (4) is the present discounted value of future utility, expressed as an annuity with discount rate r: The reduction in the value of this annuity (i.e., the reduction in the value of the agent's program), caused by the tax, is W k ðkÞ½tðtÞbðkÞ: Eq. (3) means that this effect of the tax is independent of the value of k: The agent views a time-consistent tax like a lump sum reduction in the dollar value of future utility, equal to atðtÞ r :
The previous results lead to the following necessary and sufficient condition for time consistency. 
The proof of this proposition shows that the agent's consumption rule is
We refer to Eq. (5) as the consistency constraint, since the government's optimal program is time consistent if and only if it holds.
2 Proposition 2 extends Xie's Proposition 3 in two respects. First, it shows that the possibility of time consistency is very general. Given primitive functions U and f ; we can construct b to obtain a time-consistent tax. Xie restricts bðkÞ f ðkÞ; i.e. he assumes that the government must use a linear income tax. Second, our Proposition 2 is a necessary and sufficient condition, rather than only a sufficient condition.
Given the utility and production functions, the consistency constraint is an ordinary differential equation (ODE). The solution to this ODE depends on two parameters, a and a constant of integration that determines the boundary condition to Eq. (5). Denote this constant of integration by g: The set of time-consistent rules is the two-parameter family of functions bðk; a; gÞ; when there is no ambiguity, we suppress the arguments a and g:
Stationarity
If the function bðkÞ satisfies the time consistency constraint, then for values of k along the optimal trajectory the government has no incentive to revise the optimal time-dependent component of the tax tðtÞ announced at time 0. If for some reason the state k departs from the equilibrium path, the government might want to change the original open-loop policy tðtÞ: In that case, the optimal open-loop policy is not subgame perfect.
However, if for all initial conditions the optimal function tðtÞ announced at time 0 is a constant that is independent of the initial condition (i.e., if the policy is stationary) then the policy is obviously subgame perfect. The following proposition provides a restriction involving the primitive functions U; V ; and f and the tax policy b that is necessary and sufficient for the optimal t to be a constant. We assume that the steady state is independent of the initial condition. 
The optimal trajectory t Ã ðtÞ is a constant t (independent of the initial condition) if and only if there exists a t such that the following equation holds identically in k:
where
We refer to Eq. (8) as the stationarity constraint. We showed above that given the primitive functions U and f ; the set of timeconsistent policy rules bðkÞ is a two-parameter family of functions that depend on a and g: If the government is required to use a time-consistent policy, then at time 0 it is able to choose a and g and the open-loop trajectory tðtÞ to maximize its payoff. If we also impose the requirement that the policy is stationary, then the policy rule bðkÞ must satisfy Eq. (8). In general, there is no guarantee that there exist functions bðkÞ and c Ã ðkÞ that satisfy Eqs. (5), (6) , and (8). The next section uses examples to show that such functions exist in some cases.
It might appear that when imposing the stationarity constraint we obtain an additional degree of freedom, the parameter t: That is, it might appear that in selecting a stationary time-consistent policy the government is able to choose three parameters, a; g and t: This interpretation is incorrect. Without loss of generality, we can normalize by setting t ¼ 1: The government has only two free parameters, a and g:
Examples with logarithmic utility
We use an example with logarithmic utility to illustrate the relation between the time-consistent policy and the production function f ðkÞ: We then show how the stationarity requirement reduces the set of time-consistent policies.
For UðcÞ ¼ ln c; Eq. (5) can be written as
Eq. (10) illustrates that (given the utility function) we can treat either the production function f ðkÞ or the tax function bðkÞ as primitive; using (10) to solve for the other function, we obtain a time-consistent tax. Substituting Eq. (10) into Eq. (6) we obtain
Thus, under logarithmic utility the use of a time-consistent tax implies that c ¼
The government chooses the constant a: The relation between b and c does not depend on the production function f ðkÞ: The time-consistency constraint does not restrict the ratio between public and private expenditures, since the government is able to choose the function tðtÞ: Suppose that we take the production function as primitive 4 and moreover we assume that production is linear: f ðkÞ ¼ Ak; A40: In this case, inspection of Eq. (10) confirms that the affine tax is a particular solution; i.e. the linear tax is time consistent. The linear wealth tax in this case is b ¼ arK; and the corresponding income tax is b ¼ ar A Ak: The general solution to the ODE gives bðkÞ as an implicit function of k: We can invert that implicit function to write k as an explicit function of b:
Any tax rule that solves this implicit equation is time consistent. Some of these taxes may give the regulator a higher payoff than the linear tax. Provided that tðtÞ40; convexity of bðkÞ insures that the necessary conditions to the agent's problem are sufficient to give an optimum. Convexity of bðkÞ holds if and only if gp0:
5
We now consider the stationary time-consistent policy for the case where UðcÞ ¼ ln c and V ðGÞ ¼ lnðGÞ ¼ lnðbÞ: The last equality uses the budget constraint G ¼ tbðkÞ and the normalization t ¼ 1: Using the definition of Z (Eq. (9)) and Eq. (11) we have 1Às ; 0oso1; we can show that if the tax rule satisfies the consistency condition, then the consumption rule is c ¼ a
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This result reduces to Eq. (11) as s-1 (i.e. for logarithmic utility). Suppose, in addition, that f ðkÞ ¼ k y : In the case where y ¼ s it is straightforward to show that bðkÞ ¼ f ðkÞ satisfies the consistency condition, as Xie's Proposition 2 states. For yas we can solve the consistency condition numerically to obtain time-consistent tax rules. 4 As noted above, we can also take the tax function as primitive. An earlier version of this paper shows that the linear income tax ðbðkÞ f ðkÞÞ is time consistent if and only if the production function is affine; the linear capital tax ðbðkÞ kÞ is time consistent if and only if f ðkÞ ¼ km ln k þ kg; with m 1Àar a and aX 1 r : 5 For g ¼ 0; bðkÞ is obviously monotonically increasing. For go0; bðkÞ is monotonically increasing for all k if Aor: If go0 and in addition A4r; then bðkÞ is increasing provided that k is less than a critical value. This critical value can easily be obtained from Eq. (12).
Using this expression and Eq. (11), Eq. (8) simplifies to db dk
Since db dk a0 Eq. (13) implies that a ¼ The stationarity constraint removes one degree of freedom from the government, by pinning down the value of a: The government still has one degree of freedom: it chooses the boundary condition to the ODE (10); i.e., the government chooses the parameter g:
We noted that the time-consistency constraint does not restrict the equilibrium ratio of public and private expenditures. The stationarity constraint, however, implies that consumption of the private good is twice the level of consumption of the public good. This result does not depend on the production function or on the particular time-consistent stationary tax that the government uses.
If we specialize further by choosing linear production, f ðkÞ ¼ Ak; the stationary time-consistent tax is a solution to Eq. (12) with a ¼ Appendix. Proofs Proof of Lemma 1. The argument that establishes Xie's Proposition 1 also demonstrates the ''only if'' part of the claim in the more general case where gðk; tÞ ¼ bðkÞtðtÞ; e.g. where bðkÞaf ðkÞ; we do not repeat the argument here. To establish the ''if '' part, note that in the case where consumption is not controllable, the government has a control problem with one state variable, k; the initial value of which is predetermined. (When q t ¼ qðk t Þ; i.e., when qðtÞ is independent of tðsÞ; sXt; the initial value of q is not free.) The solution to this kind of control problem satisfies the dynamic programming Principle of Optimality, and is thus time where t Ã ðtÞ is the reference tax policy, hðtÞ is a continuously differentiable function of time which represents a perturbation, and a is a scaling parameter for perturbation. When a ¼ 0 we obtain the reference policy. The value function of the consumer is now parameterized by a; given the perturbation function hðtÞ and the policy function t Ã ðtÞ: We write this value function asJðk t ; ftðsÞg 5) is satisfied. It suffices to show that under this condition, the consumption path is independent of the time-dependent part of tax policy.
Consider the consumption plan given by Eq. (6). We can verify that this consumption plan satisfies the first order conditions for the agent's control problem and the transversality condition. (This verification uses the same steps as Xie's proof.) Moreover this consumption plan is independent of the time-dependent part of tax policy, tðtÞ and therefore is uncontrollable.
The necessary part follows from Corollary 1. Using (3) in (4) 
Using (A.4) and (A.5) we can solve for the optimal consumption rule c Ã ðkÞ to obtain Eq. (6). Finally, using the first order condition U 0 ðcÞ ¼ W k and Eqs. (3) and (6) (7), and denote t fb ðkÞ as the feedback representation of the solution to this problem. We assume that the steady state to this problem, k ss ; is independent of the initial condition. The proof of Proposition 3 uses the following lemma:
Lemma A.2. Given a time-consistent policy rule bðkÞ; the optimal t o ðtÞ; is a constant (independent of the initial condition) for all initial conditions k 0 ak ss if and only if the feedback form of the policy, t fb ðkÞ is independent of k.
Proof. Taking as given the parameters a and g; Eqs. (6) and (5) 
